Changing Surroundings: Geo-engineering Our Way Out of Climate Change

Introduction

As climate change becomes inevitable, the public, government, and scientific community will begin to consider the idea of altering the climate in order to prevent further change.  These processes and projects are known as geo-engineering.  They center on the principle that if we can not muster the social will or technological ingenuity to prevent a changing climate we will have to reengineer nature to prevent climate change’s worst extremes, or reverse the process.  There are many different ideas on the table, all of which should be viewed skeptically given the complexity of our ecological systems and the scale of change altering the Earth’s climate implies.  Currently, there are tests being proposed and postponed in the UK that would use an enormous hose to inject sulfates into the stratosphere, cooling the planet.  Such projects bring with them a host of international governance issues.  All geo-engineering projects propose actions with global implications and their effects will traverse national boundaries.  Some projects may indirectly harm other nations; which raises the question of who will be held responsible when that happens.  What institutions, if any, will have authority over geo-engineering?  Will there be an international decision making and approval process or will nations act unilaterally?  Without these questions answered the prospects for a successful project are slim, or conversely, the chances of an ill-conceived project are greater. 

As a result of the complexity of Earth’s climate systems geo-engineering is a risky and controversial subject; however it can easily be viewed as a last second fix.  Thus it is incredibly important to understand the issues at stake.  To do this I will be discussing multiple proposed geo-engineering fixes to climate change and their possible ecological, political, and legal impacts.  Outside of that I will be reviewing the aforementioned sulfur injection project, the SPICE project, and the governance and approval mechanisms that are currently being used to regulate it.  Geo-engineering is a dangerous path which humanity seems headed for.  Adequate safeguards against reckless project implementation are not in place.  As a result, international regimes need to be formed to ensure that anything implemented does not create a cycle of projects of ever increasing scale.

Refugees and the Environment: Ensuring Rights in an Uncertain World

A Case Study in Kenya

Introduction

Kenya has been dealing with refugees arriving in large numbers from Somalia (and other regions in the Horn of Africa) for about two decades.  This influx proved too much for Kenya from the beginning.  Refugees have lost many of the rights they were once accorded in Kenya, in the process being confined to overcrowded camps.  They are harassed by the Kenyan authorities and discriminated against by the populace.  As a result of their low social standing and the practically hopeless situation in the camps, some refugees are now turning towards terrorism and arms trafficking.  The refugee complex at Dadaab, the largest refugee complex in the world, has become a hub for these activities.  Currently the government is doing nothing to improve the camp's conditions.  As a result, the situation can only get worse.  Situations like this are going to increase around the world as climate change progresses; instances of conflict as a result of forced migration will become more common.  In order to alleviate such tensions I recommend there be concrete pathways to citizenship created and implemented.  By allowing refugees a path towards citizenship they, as a group, can work towards garnering more rights for themselves and becoming legitimate members of their host society, lessening the chance of violent conflict due to their inhumane treatment.

To argue my proposal I will be using the last 20 years of Kenyan history as a case study.  I am going to review Kenyan refugee policy prior to the arrival of the Somali refugees of the early ‘90s, the turning over of refugee affairs to UNHCR, the poor conditions of the Dadaab refugee camps, conditions for Kenyans in neighboring areas and cities, the consequences of the current drought and famine in Somalia for refugees, the population’s reaction to refugees, possible solutions to the refugee problem, and what this could mean for refugees of environmental disasters in general.  Tying this theme into climate change will be a priority for the final section of the paper.  Currently, what provisions there are for the protection of displaced persons do not take into consideration the special circumstances climate change will pose.  The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the subsequent 1967 Protocol only refer to people fleeing from political discrimination or violence (UNGA, 1951; UNGA, 1956).  As a result, new standards have to be created for environmental refugees; standards that can be applicable for the entire world.  I say new because extending the previous rights from the 1951 Convention will not be enough.  With the recent failure to reach binding emissions cuts in the Durban Accord rising average global temperatures will cause increased climate stresses.  Refugees of climate disasters are more likely to be permanently displaced, especially if there is a permanent climate shift.  As a result, more long-term solutions than repatriation will have to be sought.  Permanence of displacement will have to be acknowledged and dealt with.

Perverse Incentives in the Clean Development Mechanism: How Corporations and States can Circumvent Carbon Market Regulations

            On December 11, 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was initially adopted and on February 16, 2005 it entered into force.  The point of the Kyoto Protocol was to create an international regime that would multilaterally reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Overall, the Protocol was a platform from which emissions reductions were supposed to happen.  In order to assist developing countries in continuing industrialization and modernization, and ease the burden of emissions reductions on developed countries, mechanisms were added to the Kyoto Protocol.  The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) have allowed countries to continue emitting if they reduce future emissions through development projects that support tertiary sustainable development.  In some cases however, this has not reduced total emissions but created a situation where any company which emits GHGs under the jurisdiction of the Kyoto Protocol can rely on offsets to continue emitting GHGs on the same level or even increase emissions.  This situation is known as a perverse incentive, where the incentive to fund the sustainable development project comes from increased profits or rewards which work against or undermine the purpose of the CDM, Kyoto Protocol, and (in this case) climate change mitigation in general. Recently it has come to light that various European corporations and Western banks have been taking advantage of a perverse incentive within the CDM via HFC-23 destruction.  This has produced larger than normal emissions reductions for European corporations and substantial profits for HCFC-22 producers and their financiers.  As a result stricter regulations, credit allotment methodology, and oversight are needed to ensure such practices do not continue.  The integrity of the European Union Emissions Trading System, the Clean Development Mechanism, and the Kyoto Protocol rely on this.

Environmental Security and GHG Mitigation

Adaptation is not a solution: Loss of security and international order in a world not focused on greenhouse gas mitigation

Abstract

With the advent of the anthropocene, climate change is the central problem humans face with GHG mitigation being the overarching solution.  However, policymakers tend to push mitigation efforts aside while allowing adaptation efforts to take precedence.  This is especially common in the developed nations, especially the United States, where it is believed a changing climate could be beneficial to agriculture and trade.  This disregards the possibility for tipping points and dangerous climate change which would overstress the international system creating perilous security situations that no country can escape from.  Central to this problem is the current definition of environmental security, which is contested, and the seriousness with which the idea is taken.  Defining environmental security accurately is important because how people conceptualize a problem is based on the way it is thought of and the contexts in which it is used.  Some say that since environmental security is not a direct threat to the sovereignty of the state it does not deserve precedence over the economy or territorial disputes as a cause of conflict.  Adaptation is not a solution, however, argues that the synergy created by the different simultaneous problems climate change will bring necessitates it precedence over other security concerns.  Agricultural problems, increased frequency of natural disasters, health problems from new and spreading diseases, and the subsequent economic stress will create expanding compound problems that will stress the relationships between various nations and the IOs that have been created within the last half century.  Without defining environmental security as its own discipline the synergistic effects of the problems of climate change will not have the weight necessary to make an impact on the field in a timely manner.  As a result of the seriousness of climate change, nations need to move away from a focus on adaptation, despite its increasingly apparent need now, and begin to take GHG mitigation seriously.

The Chicago Climate Exchange

This is the second installment of a paper I am currently writing.  More material will follow soon.  The paper is a comparison of the effectiveness of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and Chicago Climate Exchange to the Kyoto Protocol, the effectiveness of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Major Economies Forum, and an analysis of a small survey I performed of climate scientists and sustainability professionals.

The Chicago Climate Exchange

            In 2003, two Northwestern professors received a grant to develop a carbon market for private industry in the United States.  They partnered with various professionals and corporations and from that the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) was born.  The CCX originally had thirteen participants in 2003: American Electric Power, Baxter International Inc., the City of Chicago, DuPont, Ford Motor Co., International Paper, Manitoba Hydro Corp., MeadWestvaco  Corp., Motorola Inc., STMicroelectrics, Stora Enso North America, Temple-Inland Inc., and Waste Management Inc.  Since that time the total number of participants (in the direct emissions portion) has grown to 84.  “Participants include major corporations, utilities, and financial institutions with activities in all 50 states, 8 Canadian provinces, and 16 countries.” (Chicago Climate Exchange)

            There have been two phases to the Chicago Climate Exchange thus far, before it was sold to InterContinental Exchange and merged with various other cap and trade programs.  I will be focusing on those two phases.  Phase I ran from 2003 to 2006 and Phase II ran from 2007 to 2010.  What separates them are the starting point for the baseline emissions scenarios.  The baseline for Phase I had to be the organizations average annual emissions from 1998-2001, while the Phase II baseline could either be the average annual emissions from 1998-2001 or the single year of 2000.  This gave those entering the CCX at a later date greater leeway in determining their baseline emissions, allowing them an easier path to meeting their emissions reduction targets.  This should not take away from the magnitude of the CCX’s success however.

Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

Excerpt from my current project.

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

            The RGGI is a compact, originally formed between 10 New England states, to regulate the greenhouse gas emissions coming from their power sectors.  Since its inception it has lost one member, New Jersey, beginning on January 1st, 2012. (Martin, 2010)  That is as a result of political reasons however, not the success or failure of the initiative to achieve its goals.  The initiative regulates 211 power facilities in nine states currently.  Its current members are comprised of Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 

            The RGGI operates through an emissions allowance auction system.  Unsold allowances for the current year as well as all previous are auctioned in predetermined amounts quarterly.  Half of the allotment of total future emissions allowances for each year for the next four years can be auctioned.  Initial asking prices are determined “based on the Consumer Price Index, or 80-percent of the current market price of the particular RGGI allowance vintage being auctioned.” (RGGI, 2008)  The first control period lasted for three years from 2009-2011, after which it was decided in 2012 whether unsold allowances from previous years would be carried over into the new market. (RGGI , 2008; RGGI, 2012b)  Each state has its own way of determining the number the allowances it will make available for auction.  Their methods are defined in state statutes and regulations. (RGGI, 2012a)

            The entirety of the RGGI comprises an emissions market totaling 188 million tons of CO2.  This is ~29% of the size of the Chicago Climate Exchange (at an initial ~700 million tons of CO2 for Phase II), making it substantially smaller.  What is more important however, for determining systematic effectiveness at least, is understanding the percentage of total emissions cut.  For the first two 3-year periods the emissions baseline will remain steady and it will also be the compliance requirement.  After 2014, the baseline will decrease by 2.5% every   Each state has its own baseline set within the Memorandum of Understanding and its subsequent amendments, which are as stated: Connecticut, 10,695,036 tons; Delaware, 7,559,787 tons; Maine, 5,948,902 tons; Maryland, 37,503,983 tons; Massachusetts, 26,660,204 tons; New Hampshire, 8,620,460 tons; New Jersey, 22,892,730 tons; New York, 64,310,805; Rhode Island, 2,659,239 tons; Vermont, 1,225,830 tons.

            Not every allowance is sold however.  Some were not offered at auction and some were offered but not sold.  Of those not offered some were sold at a fixed price, transferred from state set-aside accounts, and some remained in set-aside accounts.  Of those in set-aside account a portion were retired.  For each state the portion of allowances remaining each year was different.  The number of allowances retired, and therefore tons of CO2 mitigated, and their percentage of the allowance budget per state is as followed: Connecticut, 6,802,914 tons, 21.2%; Delaware, 6,628,589 tons, 29.2%; Maine, 3,172 tons, 1.8%; Maryland, 6,501,404 tons, 5.8%; Massachusetts, 16,831,266 tons, 21%; New Hampshire, 452 tons,  <.01%; New Jersey, 15,706,238 tons, 22.9%; New York, 43,829,771 tons, 22.7%; Rhode Island, 1,706,721 tons, 21.4%; Vermont, 792,092 tons, 21.5%.  On the whole the RGGI states reduced emissions from their power sectors by an average of 16.76% for the First Control Period, with New Hampshire dragging the average down by two percentage points. (RGGI, 2012b)  On the whole emissions were reduced by 17.5% from their baseline.  This compares favorably with the outcome of the Chicago Climate Exchange’s Phase I.

Figure 1                                                                                                                                            Figure 2

RGGI Allowance Allocations Breakdown by Status and State (RGGI, 2012a)

http://goo.gl/YCeEg - Yale Environment 360 article

RGGI Inc. (2008). Design elements regional allowance auctions under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Retrieved from Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative website: http://www.rggi.org/docs/20080317auction_design.pdf

RGGI Inc. (2010). Relative effects of various factors on RGGI electricity sector CO2 emissions: 2009 compared to 2005. Retrieved from Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative website: http://www.rggi.org/docs/Retrospective_Analysis_Draft_White_Paper.pdf

RGGI Inc. (2011). RGGI compliance report. Retrieved from Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative website: https://rggi-coats.org/eats/rggi/index.cfm?fuseaction=reportsv2.final_compliance_summary_rpt&clearfuseattribs=true

RGGI Inc. (2012). Allowance allocation. Retrieved from http://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/allowance_allocation

RGGI Inc. (2012). First control period CO2 allowance allocation. Retrieved from Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative website: http://www.rggi.org/docs/Allowance-Allocation.pdf